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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah R. App. Pro., and Section 78-22(3)(j), Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. It arises out of a
final judgment entered by the trial court dated September 19,
2006. Notice of Appeal was filed on October 19, 2006.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR, AND STANDARD OF, REVIEW
Appellant Aurora believes this case presents the
following issues for review to be determined under the
accompanying standards of review:
1. Whether the trial court erred, under the undisputed facts
herein, in awarding trial court costs to defendants by entering a
new "final judgment' on September 19, 2 006, when the actual final
judgment following which costs could be awarded under R. 54(d),
Utah R. Civ. Pro., was entered on or about July 13, 2004.
STANDARD: Correction of error, no deference. Lyon v. Burton, 5
P.3d 616, 637 (Utah 2000).
RECORD CITATION: R. 3399-3404.
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Aurora
sanctions under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. Pro., including reasonable
attorney fees, against defendants' and/or their counsel for
seeking said trial court cost award when it was clearly barred
under the express provisions of Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. Pro.,and
all cases interpreting said cost rule.
STANDARD: Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule
11 is a question of law, under a correction of error, no

1

deference standard. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989)
RECORD CITATION: R. 3399-3404.
3. Whether the appellate court should impose further
sanctions against defendants and/or their counsel under Rules 33,
34 and 40, Utah R. App. Pro., for necessitating Aurora's pursuit
of this appeal of the trial court's clearly erroneous award of
trial costs.
STANDARD: As these rules are functionally similar to Rule 11,
Utah R. Civ. Pro., the standard should also be a question of law.
Jeschke v. Willis, supra; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, supra.
RECORD CITATION: N/A.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The issues on appeal are governed by:
(A) Issue # 1, above, is determined by the express language of
Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. Pro., and the cases interpreting said
rule, including Lvon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 637 (Utah 2000);
(B) Issue # 2, above, is determined by Rule 11(b), Utah R. Civ.
Pro., and cases or legal authorities interpreting said rule;
(C) Issue # 3, above, will be governed by Rules 33, 34, and 40,
Utah R. App. Pro., and the defendants' actions in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is solely about the propriety of the trial
court's entry of a new "final judgment" herein for the express
purpose of allowing defendants to seek an award of trial court
costs which, under the express terms of Rule 54(d) and cases
2

interpreting it, was barred because it was clearly untimely and
was required to have been requested within five days of the entry
of the true "final judgment" herein on July 13, 2004.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 13, 2004, the trial court entered its final judgment
dismissing Aurora's claims with prejudice for purported
violations of a discovery order. R. 3276-79. Defendants at that
time made no attempts to seek recovery of their trial court
costs. Following the appeal affirming that final judgment, the
case was remitted to the trial court on June 6, 2006. R. 3350-58.
On June 19, 2006, defendants filed their Verified Bill of Costs
on Appeal. R. 3364-67. Also on June 19, 2006, defendants filed a
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, R. 3372-94, along with a
Verified Memorandum of Costs, R.3368-71, seeking an award of
costs allegedly incurred for trial court activity prior to the
entry of the judgment of July 13, 2 004. On June 25, 2 006, Aurora
filed its Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion for Entry of
Final Judgment, and Request for Sanctions (Motion to tax bill of
costs, R. 54). R. 3399-3404. On July 6, 2006, defendants filed
their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Final
Judgment and Opposition to Request for Sanctions, and on July 17,
2006, Aurora filed its Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memo
Opposing Motion to Tax Bill of Costs and for Sanctions. [For some
reason, these last two filings are not in the record on appeal.
Aurora has therefore included copies of these filings in the
Addendum.] On September 19, 2006, the trial court, without
comment, signed and entered defendants' submitted "Final
3

Judgment" which awarded all of defendants' requested trial court
costs. On October 19, 2006, Aurora filed its Notice of Appeal,
appealing only the trial court's award of trial court costs and
its refusal to award Rule 11 sanctions against defendants. R.
3416-18.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in awarding defendants their trial
court costs because under the express terms of R. 54(d), Utah R.
Civ. Pro., and cases interpreting said rule, the verified
Memorandum of Costs of the prevailing party must be filed within
five days of the entry of the judgment which was final for
purposes of appeal. This was the judgment of the trial court
entered on July 13, 2004, yet defendants did not file such
memorandum until June 19, 2 006, almost two years after it was
time-barred under Rule 54(d) (2) .
The trial court further erred in failing to award Rule 11
sanctions against defendants and in favor of Aurora because it is
apparent from the numerous decisions of Utah courts that
defendants' request for trial costs at such a late date was
frivolous, that any reasonable inquiry by defense counsel would
have turned up the uniform rejection of untimely cost awards
memoranda, and defendants' failure to even acknowledge, let alone
attempt to distinguish, the overwhelming decisional authority
rejecting defendants7 untimely request for trial costs.
Finally, assuming defendants will continue to assert their
frivolous argument that Rule 54(d) actually expects costs awards
to be sought after completion of the appeal, the Court should
4

impose appropriate sanctions against defendants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF TRIAL COSTS ON SEPTEMBER 19, 2 006,
WHEN THE RULE 54(d) FINAL JUDGMENT HEREIN WAS ENTERED ON
JULY 13, 2 004, IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
AND MUST BE REVERSED
The trial court's award of trial court costs to defendants
over two years after the entry of final judgment herein is
clearly erroneous and must be reversed. The trial court's final
judgment herein pursuant to Rule 54, Utah R. Civ. Pro., was
entered on July 13, 2 004, dismissing Aurora's claims as a
sanction for purported violations of a discovery order. Under the
express provisions of Rule 54(d)(2), defendants were required to
file their verified cost memorandum within five days of this July
13, 2004 Order in order to recover trial costs or be barred from
recovering those costs. Instead, defendants waited until after
Aurora's appeal of the July 13, 2 004, final judgment to attempt
to recover their trial costs by filing a motion for the court to
enter a new final judgment for the express purpose of allowing
them to be awarded their clearly untimely cost request.
The language of Rule 54(d)(2) cannot be more clear as to
what is required of a party who seeks to recover their costs
incurred in obtaining the judgment:
(d)(2) How assessed.
The party who claims his costs
must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon
the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of
a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to the
affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action
5

or proceeding
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah R. Civ. Pro. Obviously, the rule provides for
filing and serving the cost memo within five days of the entry of
the judgment ready for appeal. It does not provide for an award
pursuant to a motion seeking a new judgment for the sole purpose
of asking for a cost award which is plainly untimely, two years
after the final judgment defined in Rule 54(a).
This five-day time limit has been strictly construed by
Utah's courts. If the required memorandum is not filed within
five days of entry of the judgment, any cost award is barred.
Lyon v. Burton, Utah 2000, 5 P.3d 616, 637 (failure to file the
verified memorandum of costs within five days of the judgment
prevents the award of costs); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. N.Y.
Terminal Warehouse Co., Utah 1960, 350 P.2d 626, 630-31 (failure
to timely file is fatal to recovery of costs); Brown v.
Jorgensen, Utah Ct. App. 2006, 136 P.3d 1252, 1259 (costs are
allowed only if the requisite memorandum is filed within five
days of the judgment).
The requirement of filing the cost memorandum within five
days of the entry of the judgment has been described by Utah's
courts as a "well-established" blanket rule. In re Sheville, Utah
Ct. App. 2003, 71 P.3d 179, 181. Further, the five-day
requirement's mandatory language leaves no discretion to the
trial court. Lyon v. Burton, supra at p. 637; Ault v. Holden,
Utah 2002, 44 P.3d 781, 793. Thus, defendants' clearly untimely
attempt to resuscitate the cost award by asking the trial court
to simply enter a new "final judgment" is thoroughly rejected by
6

the express language of Rule 54(d) and all Utah cases addressing
the issue of the procedure to obtain a cost award.
Defendants' only argument to the trial court was that the
simple phrase in Rule 54(d)(1), "..., provided, however, where an
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other
proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause

", means that seeking the cost award after the appeal

is complete is perfectly appropriate. Of course, such a
suggestion is patently absurd, and the phrase cited by defendants
in defense of their untimely cost request quite obviously means
merely that should an appellate court determine that the trial
court's judgment must be modified or reversed, the cost award, if
affected, must be altered, amended or stricken to conform to the
appellate decision.
Defendants' reliance on the "shall abide" language in R.
54(d)(1) is completely unfounded, unsupported by any decision and
is contrary to well-settled principles of statutory construction.
First, the phrase is within the subsection of the rule providing
to whom the cost award may be awarded, not the subsection
establishing the procedure by which the award is to be assessed.
Second, under the usual meaning of the words, a caution that
where an appeal is pursued, the cost award "shall abide the final
determination of the cause" presumes the prior existence of an
award which must "abide" the final determination. Furthermore,
adopting defendants' strained argument (that this simple phrase
means it is perfectly proper to wait until after appeals are
7

finished to file for costs) results in the complete evisceration
of the very specific language of R. 54(d)(2) as to the procedure
for seeking an award of costs at trial. This clearly would
violate the accepted principle of construction that a court has a
duty to avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders
portions of the statute, or related statutes, meaningless. Lyon
v. Burton, supra at p.62 3 n.5. Defendants' suggestion that their
interpretation of Rule 54(d) would conserve judicial time and
resources can hardly be recalled with a straight face. If the
need for a separate appeal over a cost award sounds like
something which the appellate courts of this state would welcome
on a regular basis, then defendants' argument would make sense.
But, as this is not something courts would welcome, by any
rationale, it is completely frivolous.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING RULE 11
SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS BECAUSE DEFENDANTS'
ARGUMENTS WERE FRIVOLOUS AND NOT SUPPORTED
BY ANY LEGAL AUTHORITY
The trial court herein erred not only by actually granting
defendants their cost award in contravention of well-established
legal authority, but also erred in failing to award Aurora its
reasonable attorney fees in having to oppose defendants7 motion
for the cost award as a sanction under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ.
Pro., or other authority such as Section 78-27-56, Utah Code
Ann., or the court's inherent power.
Rule 11 provides, in relevant part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting a pleading,
8

written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the
best of the persons knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law; ... .
R. 11, Utah R. Civ. Pro. It is quite apparent that defendants and
their counsel sought the cost award in violation of part (2) of
subsection (b) of Rule 11.
First, defendants' counsel made no argument whatsoever to
the trial court for any extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, but only argued that defendants' cost award request
was, in fact, warranted by existing law. The sole argument of
defendants was that, in spite of all the cases cited by Aurora
demonstrating their cost award request was untimely and therefore
barred under the provisions of Rule 54(d)(2), the single phrase
found in R. 54(d)(1) about the award "abiding" the final
determination of the cause in the event of an appeal should allow
defendants to seek the cost award after the appellate process is
completed. As seen above in Point I, this suggestion by
defendants is patently absurd because it results in the complete
abrogation of the express terms of R. 54(d)(2) which sets out the
procedure by which a cost award must be sought, and is also at
odds with the statutory scheme governing judgments, cost awards
and filing appeals which clearly establish a time schedule in
which to perform these tasks without need for a separate appeal
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process over a cost award.
One treatise has suggested that courts consider the
following factors in judging whether a paper is truly warranted
by a nonfrivolous argument for a change in law:
1. whether the presenter has offered arguments in support of
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
2. the legal sufficiency and plausibility of those
arguments;
3. the creativity, novelty, or innovativeness of those
arguments;
4. any other objective indication that the presenter sought
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
5. the candor and adequacy of the discussion of existing
law, including adverse precedent;
6. the clarity or ambiguity of existing law;
7. the nature of the case, including whether constitutional
doctrines are implicated; and
8. the danger of chilling either (i) the enthusiasm or
creativity of counsel or (ii) reasonable efforts to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse (3d ed.
2000 at § 12(B)). Factor # 7 is not relevant because no
constitutional doctrines are involved in this case. All other
factors militate against the position of defendants: As to factor
# 1, defendants did not make any argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, instead arguing that
their position was merited under existing law; as to factor #s 2
& 3, as seen above, the position of defendants would eviscerate
the current provisions of Rule 54(d)(2) as to how procedurally to
obtain a cost award; as to factor # 4, defendants made no attempt
to seek any change in the law, but only asserted that existing
law supported their position in spite of being unable to cite any
legal authority to back up their claim; as to factor # 5, this
severely goes against defendants since they completely failed to
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cite or address in any way the numerous decisions holding
adversely to their position; and, as to factor #6, the
requirement of filing the cost memorandum within five days of the
entry of the underlying judgment has been described as "wellestablished" law by the Utah appellate courts.
The 1993 Advisory Committee Note states that "although
arguments for a change of law are not required to be specifically
so identified, a contention that is so identified should be
viewed with greater tolerance under the rule" (Appendix F ) .
However, as shown above, defendants made no acknowledgment of
existing case law on this issue in the trial court. Courts
uniformly find that the issue of compliance with Rule 11
certification requirements is to be judged on an objective basis,
to eliminate any "empty-head pure-heart" justification for
patently frivolous arguments. This objective standard is derived,
at least in part, from the rule's "reasonable inquiry" language.
It is difficult to immagine what kind of reasonable inquiry
defendants' counsel could have made without discovering the
fairly voluminous caselaw in Utah dealing precisely with the
questions of how and when a cost award must be sought. The cases
cited by Aurora holding adversely to defendants' position were
easily found in the annotation notes following the text of Rule
11 or by shepardizing those cited in the annotations. Thus, it is
impossible to believe that defense counsel was not aware of the
overwhelming authority against their position. One must instead
conclude that defendants' intent was certainly to mislead the
trial court. As one court has stated, "Distortion of the law is
11

'precisely the sort of creativity Rule 11 should chill. 7 " Gaiardo
v. Ethyl Corp., 3d Cir. 1987, 835 F.2d 479, 484 (emphasis added).
This conclusion is bolstered by the manner in which defendants
sought the cost award. Having apparently noticed that Rule
54(d)(2) requires that the verified memorandum of costs must be
filed within five days of the trial court's final judgment
dismissing Aurora's claims entered on July 13, 2 004, Aurora
believes that any reasonable inquiry would have led defense
counsel to the numerous cases holding that yes, the rule really
did mean what it says. Instead, defendants went ahead and moved
the court enter another, new "final judgment" just for the
purpose of allowing them to file a clearly untimely cost
memorandum. This action on the part of defendants' counsel
supports the presumption that they did, in fact, know that their
actions were contrary the express language of Rule 54(d) and the
decisional authority interpreting said rule.
Thus, any reasonable inquiry would have led defense counsel
to the numerous decisions establishing that the five-day
limitation following entry of judgment was hard and firm.
Instead, defense counsel moved the trial court to enter a new
judgment in order to award them their costs, and argued (without
citing any authority) that the rule actually meant for this to be
the appropriate course to pursue their costs. There really is no
other conclusion to reach than that defendants' seeking a cost
award two years after the final judgment as defined in Rule 54
was not only frivolous under any objective standard, but was done
in bad faith (though bad faith is not required to impose Rule 11
12

sanctions). The Court should find that defendants' violated Rule
11(b) (2) by filing a motion to enter a new "final judgment" in
order to seek a cost award that was clearly untimely and barred
by the terms of Rule 54(d) and decisions interpreting said rule,
and direct the trial court on remand to award Aurora its costs
and reasonable attorney fees in amounts to be determined on
remand.
POINT III
ASSUMING DEPENDANTS CONTINUE WITH THEIR
FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL, THE COURT SHOULD
AWARD AURORA MULTIPLE COSTS AND SUCH
OTHER SANCTIONS AS ARE PROPER
Assuming that defendants continue with their frivolous
argument that they not only can, but should, wait until after the
completion of any appeal process before seeking their trial court
costs, the Court will be in a position to sanction them for
pursuing this frivolous argument, under Rules 33, 34, and 40,
Utah R. App. Pro., and should do so on the basis that this
argument of defendants is, and will continue to be, a frivolous
argument. It is also clearly not a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law in that it
is directly contrary to the express provisions of R. 54(d)(2) as
to how to procedurally obtain a trial cost award, as well as that
it would require an abandonment of the decisional authorities of
Utah cases spanning over forty years.
CONCLUSION
The trial court clearly erred in entering a new "final
judgment" for the sole purpose of awarding defendants their trial
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court costs more than two years after the deadline for doing so
under the terms of Rule 54(d) and decisions interpreting that
rule.
The trial court further erred in not sanctioning defendants
under Rule 11 for their frivolous argument for the cost award,
since any reasonable inquiry into the meaning of the terms of
Rule 54(d) would have revealed the numerous decisions rejecting
defendants' position and setting a hard line against untimely
cost memoranda. The Court should direct the trial court to award
sanctions against defendants and in favor of Aurora for asserting
their frivolous arguments in support of the cost award, awarding
Aurora its costs and reasonable attorney fees in amounts to be
determined on remand.
Finally, the Court should award Aurora a multiple of its
costs on appeal along with such other sanctions as may be
appropriate should defendants continue their frivolous arguments
on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of February, 2007.

j#~/fL // fc4&^n*,^

E r i c P. Hatfrtman
A t t o r n e y f o r Aurora
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney for appellant Aurora Credit
Services, Inc., hereby certifies that he served defendants herein
by depositing two true and correct copies of the above
Appellant's Brief in the U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid,
on the 21stth day of February, 2007, addressed to the following:
James E. Mag1eby
Attorney for Defendants
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
S,*L

Eric P. Hartman
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PERTINENT PORTIONS OF IMPORTANT RULES
Rule 54(d):
(d) Costs
(d) (1) To whom awarded.
Except when express provision
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of
the action, other than costs in connection with such an appeal or
other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(d)(2) How assessed.
The party who claims his costs must
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of the
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements
in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are
correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily
incurred in the action or proceeding, A party dissatisfied with
the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs
taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or
at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on
the date judgment is entered.
Rule 11(b)(1),(2):
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting a
pleading,written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law or the establishment of new law; ... .
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j^-bTY CLERK

Attorneys for XM International, LLC, Liberty
West Development, Inc., and Dennis W. Gay

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC., a
Minnesota corporation,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY
OF FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
and
vs.
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM
INTERNATIONAL, LLC a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY,
an individual,
Defendants.

OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR
SANCTIONS

Civil No.: 940904935
Honorable Leon A. Dever

Defendants Liberty West Development, Inc., XM International, LLC and Dennis W. Gay
(collectively, "Defendants") hereby submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Entry of Judgment and Opposition to Request for Sanctions.

INTRODUCTION
Aurora opposes Defendants' Motion for Entry of Final Judgment (the "Motion") on just
two grounds. First, Aurora claims that a final judgment has already been entered such that
Defendants' request for such a judgment is moot, and Defendants' submission of a memorandum
of costs incurred at the trial court level untimely. Second, Aurora takes issue with the minimal
amount of reasonable costs sought by Defendants, which include the costs for one deposition, for
transcripts of two depositions taken by Aurora, and for a $15.00 copy of the transcript of the
hearing at which this Court heard argument as to why Aurora should be sanctioned for discovery
abuse. As discussed below, neither of these arguments has merit, and Defendants' Motion
should be granted. Moreover, Aurora's baseless request for Rule 11 sanctions should be soundly
rejected.
I.

ENTRY OF A FINAL JUDGMENT IS NECESSARY AND AP i

\TE

Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. ("Aurora") characterizes Defendants' Motion as a
bad faith attempt to circumvent the provision of Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requiring the submission of a memorandum of costs within five days "after entry of judgment."
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Aurora's characterization is inaccurate and inflammatory, and
Defendants request the Court to reject Aurora's overly simplistic approach to the issues
addressed in the Motion.
While the Court's denial of Aurora's motion to alter or amend the Court's July 14, 2004
Order of dismissal was "final" for purposes of initiating an appeal Rule 54(d)(1) indicates this
kind of judgment is not "final" for purposes of awarding costs when the losing party appeals. In

?

fact, the plain language of Rule 54(d)(1) specifically provides that costs shall wail for the final
determination of the case in the event of an appeal:
[Cjosts shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for
review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added). When reading Rule 54(d)(2) in conjunction with
Rule 54(d)(1), no other reasonable interpretation can be applied. To inteipret the rules otherwise
would necessarily result in an illogical procedural waste of time - i.e. the prevailing party at trial
obtains an award of costs only to have the award become meaningless in the event the appellate
courts reverses the trial court's decision. Here, the Court of Appeals specifically remitted the
case back to this Court, and Defendants have asked the Court to conclude this case by entry of a
final judgment. At the same time, Defendants have asked this Court to include in that judgment
the very costs on appeal awarded by the Utah Court of Appeals, the amount which is to be
determined by this Court. It is this type of award and final judgment which is contemplated by
the language of Rule 54(d)(1) that "shall abide the final determination" of costs on appeal. And,
it is this Court's entry of Judgment on those costs which will constitute the final judgment in this
matter. With the appeals now having been ruled upon, Defendants' memorandum of costs was
timely filed, and Defendants* Motion should be granted.

TI

DEFENDANTS' COSTS ARE REASONABLE AND WERE NECESSARILV
INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH DEVELOPING AND PRESENTING THE
CASE
Aurora argues that Defendants" costs set forth in their Verified Memorandum of Costs

should be rejected because the depositions and transcript of a hearing involved were not
necessary to the development of the case.
Utah courts have held that, to recover costs of depositions, the Court must be persuaded
that the depositions "were taken in good faith and, in light of the circumstances, appeared to be
essential for the development and presentation of the case." Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, f 6, 16
P.3d 549 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the costs of
each of the depositions and/or transcripts claimed by Defendants were not only reasonable but
also necessary. [See generally Affidavit of James E. Magleby ("Magleby Aff."), attached as Exhibit "A"].

First, Aurora - not Defendants - noticed and took the depositions of both Dennis Gay and
Delonna Anderson. Mr. Gay was a Defendant, and Ms. Anderson a former employee of
Defendant XM International, LLC. [See Magleby Aff. 1) 4]. Defendants merely obtained transcripts
of the depositions, which was obviously necessary for bringing and opposing dispositive motions
and preparing these witnesses for trial. [See id.]. Moreover, contrary to Aurora's argument, the
fact that the case was dismissed as a sanction for Aurora's discovery abuse does not affect the
necessity for these transcripts. Up until the time of the dismissal for Aurora's discovery abuse,
Defendants were clearly required to pursue their case with zeal, without relying upon any ruling
they might have hoped to obtain.
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Second, Defendants necessarily incurred the costs associated with two days of a
deposition of Charles Zak (including the costs for recording his non-appearance for a scheduled
deposition), a principal of Aurora and likely its chief witness. [See Magleby Aff K 5]. Indeed, the
primary basis for the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in the first appeal of this matter was Mr.
Zak's testimony. See Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev.t Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah
1998). The depositions were necessary to prepare the case for trial and to the preparation of
dispositive motions in the case. [See Magleby Aff. \ 5]. Again, the dismissal of the case for
Aurora's discovery abuse has no bearing on this issue. Accordingly, the costs are appropriate
under Rule 54(d), and Defendants respectfully request an award of the same.
Finally, an award of costs is also appropriate with respect to the $15.00 transcript of the
hearing in which the Court considered the motion for sanctions against Aurora, which ultimately
led to the Court's dismissal of Aurora's case. Not only was the transcript necessary to respond to
Aurora's motion to "alter or amend" the trial court's entry of the sanction of dismissal, the
transcript was also essential for purposes of responding to Aurora's appeal. [See Magleby Aff. H 6].
In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals referred to the transcript extensively in affirming this Court's
dismissal of the case, underscoring the necessity of obtaining the transcript in the first place. See
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev 'p, Inc., 2006 UT App 48, H 1 0. 129 P.3d 287
(attached to Motion as Exhibit wiA"j. In short, Defendants* costs are appropriate and should be
awarded in full.
II.

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS FOR SANCTIONS
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According to Aurora, Defendants' request for trial court costs is '"frivolous" and
otherwise unsupported. Aurora's argument is off-mark, and is nothing short of vindictiveness
against the prevailing party. Where an interpretation of the rule is even plausible - much less
correct (as in this case) - sanctions cannot be awarded under Rule 11. See, e.g. Barnard v. Utah
Slate Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993). In fact, to transgress Rule 11, the argument needs to be
utterly meritless or objectively unreasonable; again, neither is the case here. See, e.g. Taylor v.
Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1998).
As set forth above, Rule 54(d)(1) clearly provides that an award of costs "shall abide" the
"final" determination of a case after an appeal is taken, as in this case. Thus, there is no
justification for sanctions, and the Court should soundly reject Aurora's request for the same.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request the Court to enter a final
judgment and award Defendants their requested costs. Defendants also ask the Court to deny
Aurora's baseless request for sanctions.
DATED this 6th day of July 2006.

,

MAGLEGB7 fc GREENWOOD, P.C.

James E. Magleby
Attorneys forXM International, LLC,
Liberty West Development, Inc..
and Dennis W. Gay
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.,
170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that pursuant to Rule 5(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
and OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS was delivered to the following this 6th
dayofJuly2006by:
[ ]

Hand Delivery

[ ]

Facsimile

[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ]

Federal Express

[ ] Via Electronic Mail as indicated below
Eric P. Hartman
2558 South Wilshire Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Kenneth W. Yeates
Samantha J. SI ark
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C.

170 South Main Street. Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
A Homey for Plaint iffA urora
Credit Services, Inc.

1

Exhibit "A

James E. Magleby (7247)
Christine T. Greenwood (8187)
Jason A. McNeill (9711)
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.

170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801.359.9000
Facsimile: 801.359.9011
Attorneys for XM International, LLC, Liberty
West Development, Inc., and Dennis W. Gay

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC., a
Minnesota corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES E.
MAGLEBY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL
JUDGMENT

VS.

LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM
INTERNATIONAL, LLC a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY,
an individual,
Defendants.

Civil No.: 940904935
Honorable Leon A. Dever

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, James E. Magleby, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

1.

I am over twenty-one (21) years of age and have personal knowledge of the facts

set forth in this affidavit. If called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the
matters set forth herein.
2.

I am licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and have represented the

Defendants in this matter since approximately October 2002.
3.

As set forth in the Verified Memorandum of Costs submitted by Defendants on

June 19, 2006, the costs set forth therein were reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection
with developing and presenting this case.
4.

More specifically, Defendants reasonably and necessarily spent $309.85 to obtain

a copy of the transcript of a deposition of Dennis Gay taken by Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services,
Inc. ("Aurora"), and $114.30 to obtain a copy of the transcript of Delonna Anderson taken by
Aurora. Dennis Gay is a Defendant, and.Delonna Anderson is a former employees of Defendant
XM International, LLC, and the transcripts were necessary for bringing and opposing dispositive
motions and preparing these witnesses for trial.
5.

The costs associated with two days of a deposition of Charles Zak (including the

costs for recording his non-appearance for a scheduled deposition), a principal of Aurora and
likely its chief witness, were also reasonable and necessary to the development and presentation
of this case, including for trial preparation and drafting and opposing dispositive motions.
Indeed, the primary basis for the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in the first appeal of this matter
was Mr. Zak's testimony. See Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d
1273 (Utah 1998).
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6.

Defendants' payment of $15.00 for the transcript of the hearing at which the

Court considered Defendants' motion for sanctions against Aurora for discovery abuse was also
necessary. Not only was the transcript necessary to respond to Aurora's motion to "alter or
amend" the trial court's ultimate entry of the sanction of dismissal, the transcript was also
essential for purposes of responding to Aurora's appeal.]
DATED this 6th day of July 2006.

James E. Magleby
tii

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this 6111 day of July 2006.

fnAMrAslhd
NOTARY PUBLIC
[SEAL]

MARVA ANDERSON ^

NOTARY PUBUC - STATE OF UTAH
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CTnCUT 84101
My Gomm. Exp. 10/(17/2007

C^CVA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C,
170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that pursuant to Rule 5(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
JAMES E. MAGLEBY IN SUPPO.

F MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL

JUDGMENT was delivered to the following this 6th day of July 2006 by:
[ ]

Hand Delivery

[ ]

Facsimile

[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ]

Federal Express

[ ] Via Electronic Mail as indicated below
Eric P. Hartman
2558 South Wilshire Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Kenneth W. Yeates
Samantha J. SI ark
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C.

170 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Plaintiff Aurora
Credit Services, Inc.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC-,
a Minnesota corporation, on
behalf of itself and all other
shareholders of Liberty West
Development, Inc., a corporation,

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY
TO DEFENDANTS' MEMO
OPPOSING MOTION TO
TAX BILL OF COSTS
AND FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff,
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM INTERNATIONAL, a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS
W. r*^ -t- individual,
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Defendants,

ices,
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its counsel of record, Eric P. Hartman, submits the following
Repl\
..

f

o Defendants' Memo Opposing Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Bill
3.

Once again defendants have proffered an argument to the
court without citation of any legal support for their position.
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support defendants' position is most likely because there simply
is no supporting case law or other authority. And again, when
Aurora raises the fact that defendants have cited no support for
their position, they respond with feigned outrage that anyone
Cdiild snqrjcf-'t III I "I he emperor was wea"'

j• •'

1

I

I,

again, defendants have still cited absolutely no legal support
for their proposition that their request for an award of costs is
proper over eighteen months after it was required to be submitted
under Rule 54, Utah R. Civ. Pro.
Defendants' only argument is that certain language in
the rule, that "where an appeal or other proceeding for review is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final
determination of the cause. ...", overrides the express provision
that the cost bill must be filed "within five days after the
entry of judgment... ." R. 54(d)(2), Utah R. Civ. Pro. Of course,
the judgment referred to in the rule is that "from which an
appeal lies." R. 54(a), not one which the party asks the court to
enter after appeals have been pursued. And, of course, the
language of Rule 54(d)(1) cited by defendants merely means that
where costs have been awarded based on the trial court's original
judgment, and that judgment is reversed on appeal, the cost award
must be altered, amended or set aside if the underlying judgment
is reversed on appeal, thus making it "abide" the final
determination of the cause.
The defendants' argument is seen as preposterous in
that it clearly rewrites the substantive provisions of Rule 54.
First, it abrogates the provision that the cost bill must be
served and filed within five days of the judgment. Under
defendants' proposed construction of the rule, a final judgment
may be entered by a trial court, the prevailing party may not
2

file a cost bill until twenty days after such judgment, and such
clearly untimely cost bill would be resurrected if an appeal is
filed between twenty and thirty days after the entry of judgment.
Utah's courts have rejected such argument. Lyon v Burton, Utah
2000, 5 P.3d 616, 637; Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. N.Y. Terminal
Warehouse Co., Utah 1960, 350 P.2d 626, 630-31; Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, Utah 1998, 961 P.2d 305, 318.
Furthermore, defendants' construction would promote a
practice which is clearly contrary to the scheme of the rules of
civil procedure. A judgment under R. 54 is appealable within
thirty days of its entry. Rule 54's requirement that the cost
bill be filed within five days of the entry of judgment is a
clear indication that issues arising out of the cost bill award
or non-award are to be dealt with in the initial appeal.
Obviously, should a party be able to circumvent the time
requirements of R. 54 by being able to ask the court to enter a
new judgment after appeals have been prosecuted, it would result
in numerous secondary appeals over just the cost awards. Such a
waste of time, money and judicial resources is clearly beyond the
contemplation of the rules. Additionally, it certainly would have
been a simple matter for the draftspersons of the rules to
expressly provide for the trial court cost bill to be filed after
appeals have been taken or deadlines passed. However, such is not
the case, and the rules expressly set out the times for the cost
bill and for an appeal to avoid any needless waste and
duplication such as that urged by defendants.
3

Defendants' argument that their untimely request for
trial costs is within the language of R. 54(d) is quite simply
groundless. They have made no argument as to why the well-settled
law on this issue should be modified or reversed, and is
frivilous. Thus, sanctions under R. 11, Utah R. Civ. Pro.,
against defendants and in favor of plaintiff are appropriate.
DATED this (*?

day of July, 2 006.

Eric P. tfartman
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing was served, on this /T^ day of
July, 2006, by depositing in the U.S. mail, first-class postage
prepaid, to the following:
James E. Magleby
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Eric P.
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